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Abstract 
Research on service compensation is rare. In this article we examine different compensation 
rules for integrated services (IS) which are produced jointly by a service provider and his 
client. Examples are consulting, advertising or management training. We distinguish three 
different compensation rules and compare them with joint profit maximization where both, 
service provider and client act as one organizational unit. The  ompensation rules are (1) the 
input based compensation (IBC) characterized by a compensation that is based on work hours 
or work days, (2) the sales based compensation (SBC) with the compensation based on 
client’s sales and (3) the profit based compensation (PBC) with compensation based on 
client’s profits. We can show that under reasonable, realistic conditions the IBC (surprisingly) 
leads to better results for the service provider and for the client as compared to the PBC and 
the SBC. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Consultants are compensated on the basis of man-days they work on the client’s project regardless of 
the profit the clientmakes fromthe project.Ad agencies are often compensated on the basis of the 
media costs for a campaign and not on the basis of the campaign’s success. Training formanagers and 
workers is usually compensated based on the number of seminar days the training service company 
offers. Even if there exist additional cost factors, e.g. physical input costs such as printing material, or 
sometimes the compensation may be paid as a lump sum the usual way of compensating services is 
based on input related figures: The man-days in the consultant example, the media cost in the ad 
agency case and the seminar days in the training case. All these quantities are inputs for the service 
the service provider offers. Therefore we call a compensation based on such inputs an input based 
compensation (IBC). However, there may be different “unit prices”. The unit price for one man-day 
offered by company A may be different to the compensation of one man-day offered by company B 
expressing different qualities or values of the service. The IBC is often used because the output of the 
service is not only determined by the work of the service provider but also by the work of the service 
client. If an ad agency gets an insufficient briefing the campaign may not be as successful as it could be 
with an excellent briefing. If there is no briefing at all the ad agencywill not be able to work on a 
campaign for that company since the ad agencies’ employees do neither have any detailed information 
on current market position nor on future targets. 
    However, the management literature suggests that compensating for services should be based on 
the value for the client rather than on the service provider’s cost (Lovelock et al. 1999). The client’s 
value achieved due to the service can be interpreted as the additional turnover, which can easily be 
used as a basis for compensation. One could think of a fraction α of the additional sales value the client 
achieves determined by the service after costs.We call this compensation sales based compensation 
(SBC). A second way to think about client’s value achieved could be the profit generated by the service. 
We will call it profit based compensation (PBC). 
    Another way to compensate for services is recommended in the marketing literature: “devise pay-
for-performance structures for contractible subsets but not for other sets.” (Carson et al. 1999, p. 129). 
Taking the performance as a basis for compensation we could think about the whole profit generated 
by the joint service. Service provider and client could maximize the whole profit of the service i.e. a 
company and an ad agency could try to maximize the profit generated by an ad campaign and then 
share the profit. We will call this benchmark joint profit maximization (JPM). 
    We see a contradiction between the compensation rules in use compared to the compensation rule 
recommended in the managerial literature. As Noble and Gruca (1999) observe there is no systematic 
examination on the compensation of services. Berry and Yadav even state, that from a practical point 
of view “the pricing of services in the United States is a mess” (Berry and Yadav 1996, p. 41). Here, we 
try to make a first step in this direction. 
    King (1968) analyzes the compensation of ad agencies but does not take into account clients’ input 
to the service. Compensation is typically discussed as an intra-organizational topic relating to sales 
agents (e.g. Coughlan and Sen 1989; Kissan and Thevaranjan 1998; Krafft 1999; Reichheld and Rogers 
2005).  
    This article looks at different compensation rules for services as a phenomenon between 
organizations. We examine services that are produced jointly by service provider and client like 
consulting, advertising or management training. 
    We examine services with two fundamental characteristics: (1) The service requires input from 
service provider and client. Based on this first assumption we can be more specific about the nature 
of substitutability: (2) Service provider’s input 356 H. Löbler et al. and client’s input can be substituted 
by each other to some degree as specified below. 
    Although the input of service provider and client may be substituted to some extent by each other, 
both parties have still some core competence that cannot be substituted. Consulting firms are typically 
able to work with certain concepts or techniques based on the human capital that the client companies 
may not know or may not be able to apply. Client companies on the other hand provide specific 
company information that is a precondition for the consulting firm’s work. Consulting firms do usually 
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not have this information before they cooperate with their clients. In the advertising agency example 
ad agencies but not the clients know how to design a marketing strategy whereas clients but not ad 
agencies know future plans and current market positions of the clients’ firms. Finally, training firms but 
not students know how to teach specific skills and specific knowledge. Simultaneously, students but 
not training firms have to provide the time input to allow a learning process. The essence is that both 
parties involved in the service production are unable to achieve a positive service output without the 
other party’s input. Obviously, there exist other services, e.g. car repair, where the client’s input i.e. 
time can be neglected. 
    The second service characteristic implies that an increase in service provider’s input may be 
substituted by the client’s input. Consulting firms e.g. can decrease the number of hours they work in 
a client’s company if the client’s employees provide certain inputs, e.g. preparatory work, collecting 
information within the client firm or conducting interviews with employees. Advertising agencies may 
be able to decrease their input if the client provides more information about the market the client is 
competing in. Training firms may offer programs with smaller number of seminar days if the students 
to be trained increase the number of hours they work by themselves. In all these examples we observe 
substitutability between the service provider’s and the client’s inputs. 
    We define a service where both of these features apply as integrated service (IS) and a service that 
can be provided by the service provider without substantial client support as a non-integrated service 
(NIS). An IS is always provided by both parties, the service provider and the service client, either in a 
sequential processing, in a simultaneous processing or both combined. E.g. consultants need to discuss 
the work with their clients and in doing so the clients as well as the consultants substantially determine 
the outcome of the project. The consulting process includes simultaneous work on the project. After 
such discussions the clients may have to prepare some figures of their company which the consultants 
need for their further work. Here both parties are working together in a sequential processing. 
Compared to a NIS where the garage does not need any work of her client. In our article we focus on 
the compensation of IS. 
    The plan of the paper is as follows: In Section 2 we describe the model. First we focus on modeling 
integrated services and explaining basic assumptions and then we describe the modeling of different 
compensation rules. In Section 3 we derive profit maximizing inputs for different compensation rules: 
In Section 3.1 inputs for the profit based compensation rule (PBC), in Section 3.2 inputs for the sales 
based compensation rule (SBC) and in Section 3.3 the inputs for input based compensation rule (IBC). 
In Section 3.4 we develop a frame for comparing the compensation rules from different perspectives. 
In Section 4 we compare the different rules: First we compare PBC with IBC and then we compare SBC 
with IBC. Finally, we discuss the results and their limitations in the last section. 
 
 
2 The model 
 
In this section, we first explain how we model integrated services. Then, we describe the three 
different compensation rules we compare as well as the decisions the service provider and the client 
have to make. 
 
 
2.1 Modeling integrated services 
 
Modeling the joint service production we use a very general production function, which assures that 
there is only an outcome if both, the service agent and the client, have positive inputs. The outcome 
Q is a function of the two inputs. We denote the service provider’s input IS (the agent) and the service 
client’s input IS. Q is the value of the service output produced by the two inputs. The input can e.g. be 
thought of man-days in a consulting environment or seminar days in the training environment. 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
    The variables u and v are the elasticities of production.We assume that 0 ≤ u ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ v ≤ 1 as well 
as 0 ≤ u + v ≤1. The joint production of the one service has a diminishing return in both arguments 
separately as well as jointly. We assume that Q = Q(IS, IC) is twice differentiable in each argument. 
    It is assumed that both parties have full knowledge about all parameters of the model. The 
production function describes one project. Service provider and client have already agreed upon 
working together in that project but they have not yet negotiated about compensation and inputs. 
    Clearly, these requirements qualify the inputs as incomplete substitutes. These assumptions are 
plausible for a wide class of services, e.g. consulting and training services. 
    To maximize profits we have to assume a cost function for service provider as well as client. The cost 
function is for the service provider: 
 
 
 
and for the client: 
 
 
 
    The cost function is convex. Part of the analysis is also valid for linear cost functions. 
    We assume that the service provider and client have already agreed that they work jointly on that 
project. However, they have not yet determined the compensation rule and their profit maximizing 
input which of course depends on the compensation rule. 
    To concentrate on the different compensation rules we exclude competition from our analysis in the 
sense that service provider and client have already agreed to cooperate but still have to negotiate the 
compensation. This seems reasonable because in the case of integrated services one service provider 
cannot be substituted easily by another service provider from the perspective of the client and vice 
versa after they have agreed to work together. E.g. consulting firms are specialized on different topics, 
they rely on different sets of human capital and, consequently, their services are not directly 
comparable. In a market context, this is reflected by different reputations for different areas of 
expertise of consulting firms and by relationships that very often last long. 
 
 
2.2 Compensation rules and service provider’s and client’s decision 
 
In this section, we describe the three different compensation rules mentioned above: profit-based 
compensation (PBC), sales-based compensation (SBC) and input-based compensation (IBC). We also 
examine joint profit maximization which does not serve as compensation rule but as a benchmark to 
compare the three compensation rules. The joint profit maximum is the highest profit service provider 
and client can achieve. 
 
 
2.2.1 JPM—joint profit maximization 
 
 
 
    The joint profit maximization serves as a benchmark for the comparison with the compensation 
rules. 
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2.2.2 PBC—profit based compensation 
 
The first compensation rule is the profit based compensation (PBC). Here the client offers a fraction α 
of her profit to the service provider, so the service provider gets the fraction of the client’s profit minus 
her (the service provider’s) cost. Each of them maximizes her profit with respect to her input. So the 
decision rules are: 
    For the service provider: 
 
 
 
    For the client: 
 
 
 
 
2.2.3 SBC—sales based compensation 
 
With this compensation rule the service provider gets a fraction α of the client’s sales. Again, each of 
them maximizes her profit with respect to her input. For the service provider: 
 
 
For the client: 
 
 
 
2.2.4 IBC—input based compensation 
 
Now we assume that the service provider is compensated based on her input which is a quantity 
multiplied by a price p for an input unit which has to be negotiated. For the service provider: 
 
 
 
For the client: 
 
 
 
    Under these compensation rules the client has to give at least part of her profit to the service 
provider otherwise she would not get any input from him. 
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    In Section 3, we analyze the profit maximizing inputs in terms of reaction functions. These reaction 
functions describe the input of one party (service provider or client) in terms of the input of the other 
party (service provider or client). In Section 4 we compare the profitability of the three compensation 
rules. 
 
 
3 Inputs using different compensation rules 
 
In all cases the service provider maximizes his profit with respect to his input whereas the client 
maximizes her profit according to her input. The client also has to decide about her input to maximize 
her profit. Appendix B gives a summary of all explicit solutions derived in this section. 
 
 
3.1 Inputs under PBC 
 
We now analyze PBC. The input reaction lines follow by maximizing Eqs. 2 and 3: 
 
 
 
    The service provider’s reaction line depends on α whereas the client’s does not. Both inputs are 
dependent on each other’s input. 
    In equilibrium where both reaction lines intersect, we get the explicit solution for the client’s input: 
 
 
 
and for the service provider’s input: 
 
 
 
    Both inputs depend on α and therefore it is interesting to look for optimal αs from the different 
perspectives of the service provider and the client. 
    We find an optimal α for the service provider of α=1 which cannot be established by the service 
provider, because it implies zero profit for the client. 
    From the client’s perspective the optimal share for the service provider is 
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which is between 0 and 1 so that both parties get a share of the profit. 
    Since this solution satisfies the client but not the service provider one could think about another 
solution that implies an α between 𝛼 =  
𝑢
𝜎(1−
𝑣
𝑡
)
  and α=1. A good candidate for such an α could be the 
aggregated profit maximizing α.We find that the aggregated profit maximizing α is 1 which also implies 
zero profit for the client. Since the aggregated profit maximizing α as well as the service provider’s 
profit maximizing α equal 1 the client is left without profit. Therefore, we do not consider these cases 
any further. 
 
Profits under PBC are 
 
 
 
3.2 Inputs under SBC 
 
We now analyze the case of SBC extensively and calculate profits under reasonable assumptions in 
order to be able to compare these profits to those of the other compensation rules. 
    In the SBC the client’s input is lower but also depends on the service provider’s input: 
 
 
 
    Having the inputs of the client and knowing that they depend on the service provider’s input it is 
crucial to know what the service provider’s input is under different compensation rules. The optimal 
input of the service provider in that case is: 
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    The intersection of both input reaction lines forms a typical Nash equilibrium since if the service 
provider chooses any other input 𝐼 ≤ 𝐼𝑆
𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑠𝑏
while the client holds on to 𝐼𝐶
𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑠𝑏
, the profit of S 
diminishes and vice versa. 
    The inputs in equilibrium are 
 
 
    The profits in this equilibrium are 
 
 
 
    In the next step of optimization we are now interested in those values of the service provider’s share 
α which the service provider and the client want to secure when negotiating the compensation rule in 
the first place. For this purpose, Π𝑆
𝑆𝐵𝐶  and Π𝐶
𝑆𝐵𝐶  have to be maximized as functions of α. 
    From Eq. 13 it is clear that Π𝑆
𝑆𝐵𝐶  is maximal if and only if 
 
 
 
is maximal. Since the first derivative dZ/dα vanishes if and only if α = 1− ν/τ while the second derivative 
d2Z / dα2 is negative throughout (0; 1), Z and thus Π𝑆
𝑆𝐵𝐶  takes its maximum for α = 1 − ν/τ. Analogous 
considerations show that Π𝐶
𝑆𝐵𝐶  becomes maximal if α = u/σ. 
    While the service provider is willing to give the client a share of 
𝑣
𝑡
 Q, corresponding to the elasticity 
of the production function divided by the elasticity of the cost function w.r.t. the client’s input, the 
client grants the service provider 
𝑢
𝜎
 Q, corresponding to the production elasticity divided by the 
elasticity of the cost function w.r.t. the service provider’s input. Therefore, we have  
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Both parties together want to have more than they have to distribute so they end up in a distribution 
conflict. 
    Another perspective to find an α is to maximize the aggregated profit Π𝑎𝑔𝑔
𝑆𝐵𝐶 = Π𝑆
𝑆𝐵𝐶 + Π𝐶
𝑆𝐵𝐶 with 
respect to α. Given the conflict from the individual perspectives of both parties, this α could be a good 
candidate for an agreement. The profit generated by this α is higher as compared with the case where 
one the party can establish her optimal α. 
    Because of Eqs. 13 and 14 one has 
 
 
 
which becomes maximal if and only  if 
does. 
 
    By setting dZ/dα to zero, a quadratic equation for α is obtained if 
𝑢
𝜎
 ≠
𝑣
𝜏
; of its two solutions, only 
 
lies in (0; 1); for 
𝑢
𝜎
 =
𝑣
𝜏
, a linear equation arises which is solved by α=1/2. To secure the presence of a 
maximum, one checks that d2Z/dα2 < 0. 
 
 
3.3 Profits under IBC 
 
Next, we examine IBC rule. The client’s reaction function is the same: 
 
    Under IBC the service provider’s optimal input does not depend on the client’s input as under the 
other compensation rules: 
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    While IS is fully determined by the input unit price p, IC is still dependent on IS. Knowing the service 
provider’s costs, the client can predict IS = IS(p) which allows her to determine her input based on p,
 
 
    With the inputs IS and IC, the profits of both parties become 
 
    Here again, as in the PBC and SBC cases we look from the client’s perspective to determine the price 
p, and thereby optimize profit Π𝐶
𝐼𝐵𝐶  w.r.t. this parameter. 
 
    The condition 𝑑Π𝐶
𝐼𝐵𝐶
𝑑𝑝
= 0 implies that the appropriate choice is given by 
 
 
    Taking the service provider’s perspective we get an infinite optimal p which obviously does not make 
economic sense. 
    As in the PBC and SBC case we want to know the p that maximizes the aggregated profit                
Π𝑎𝑔𝑔
𝑆𝐵𝐶 = Π𝑆
𝑆𝐵𝐶 + Π𝐶
𝑆𝐵𝐶. The profit-maximizing price p reads 
 
 
 
3.4 A perspective on the comparison of profits 
 
In our model we use a two-stage optimization. It is based on the idea that both parties maximize their 
profit with respect to their inputs for a given α and p in the second stage. The following table 
summarizes the results with respect to the optimization of α respectively p from different perspectives 
using different compensation rules. 
10 
 
 
    In the PBC case we get a meaningful client’s α (case 1, all cases refer to Table 1) but we do neither 
get a meaningful service provider’s α (case 7) nor a meaningful α for overall profit maximization (case 
4). The SBC case makes sense from all three perspectives (cases 2, 5 and 8). Moreover, the solution is 
symmetric for the client’s and the service provider’s α (case 2 and 8) and the maximization of 
aggregated profit leads to an α between the two individual solutions (case 5). Finally, in IBC we obtain 
an optimal p from the perspective of the customer (case 3) as well as a higher p from the perspective 
of aggregated profit maximization (case 6) but we do not get a meaningful solution from the service 
provider’s perspective (case 9). 
 
 
 
 
    We now compare the three compensation rules. 
 
 
4 A comparison of compensation rules 
 
To compare the three compensation rules we keep one of the perspectives specified above and use 
only meaningful results of α and p. So, we first compare PBC and IBC from the client’s perspective only 
(cases 1 vs. 3 in Table 1). Then we compare SBC and IBC from the client’s perspective (cases 2 vs. 3 in 
Table 1) as well as from the perspective of aggregated profit maximization (cases 5 vs. 6 in Table 1).We 
do not compare PBC and SBC because it turns out that IBC dominates PBC. To do so we use the reaction 
lines of the involved parties. The intersection of their reaction lines determines the Nash equilibrium. 
 
 
4.1 Comparing PBC and IBC 
 
To compare PBC and IBC we distinguish two cases. First, we compare profits assuming that the client 
maximizes her α given the PBC rule and her p given the IBC rule. Secondly, we compare the sum of 
both parties’ profits given the client’s optimal α and p. We do not compare the PBC and IBC rules for 
aggregated profit maximizing α and p. 
    (1) Comparing client’s profits in case 1 to case 3, i.e. given the client’s optimal α and p. Comparing 
profits under PBC and IBC we first focus on client’s profits given that the client can determine the α 
and p. The client’s profit under PBC with the client’s optimal α is 
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Comparing both profits leads to 
 
 
 
    (2) Comparing both parties’ aggregated profits in case 1 to case 3, i.e. given the client’s optimal α 
and p. The following figure shows the reaction functions under the two compensation rules. 
 
 
 
    In Fig. 1 as well as the following figures the abscissa shows the service provider’s input and the 
ordinate shows the customer’s input. Figure 1 shows two scenarios for plausible example values (see 
Appendix A). The client’s reaction function is the same for IBC and PBC rules and is indicated by 
R(C,IBC)= R(C,PBC). In addition, the inputs maximizing joint profit determine a point that lies on this 
reaction function and is indicated by JPM. 
    As already mentioned the service provider’s reaction function in the IBC case is a straight line 
independent from the client’s input indicated by R(S,IBC). The service provider’s reaction function in 
the PBC case is indicated by R(S,PBC).  
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    The intersection of R(S,IBC) and R(C,IBC) is the input equilibrium using the IBC compensation rule 
and indicated by EQ(IBC). The intersection of R(S,PBC) and R(C,PBC) is the input equilibrium using the 
PBC compensation rule indicated by EQ(PBC). In the IBC equilibrium both inputs are higher compared 
to the PBC equilibrium. For both compensation rules both inputs are below the aggregate profit 
maximum JPM inputs, point JPM. Since the iso-profit lines are ellipsoids around JPM the two 
equilibrium points on the R(C,PBC) are easy to compare in terms of profits. The EQ(IBC) profit must be 
higher than the EQ(PBC) profit. 
    This result can easily be generalized: 
    Drawing from the results of Section 3 we find the following relationships between the inputs for the 
service provider and for the client respectively for PBC divided by IBC, 
 
 
 
    As described above we use the client’s optimal α which is ∝ =  
𝑢
𝜎(1−
𝑣
𝑡
)
 . Then we get 
 
 
 
    Note that we must have 𝑢 + 𝑣 < 1 → 𝑢 < 1 − 𝑣 < 1 −  
𝑣
𝑡
 →  
𝑢
1− 
𝑣
𝑡
 < 1 . This means that the 
numerator is always smaller than the denominator in both fractions. Since the exponents are between 
0 and 1 for both fractions, inputs under IBC are always greater than inputs under PBC. Going back to 
the Fig. 1 with the reaction functions this implies that inputs under IBC are always closer to JPM than 
inputs under PBC. We conclude that the sum of profits under IBC must always be higher than the sum 
of profits under PBC. We did not discuss the service provider’s profits because given the results it is 
easy for the client to pay a fixed amount to the service provider so that both profits are higher 
compared to the PBC case. Therefore, IBC is a superior compensation rule as compared with PBC in 
the case of integrated services. 
    Next, since it is clear now that IBC is better than PBC we compare IBC and SBC to find the profit 
maximizing compensation rule. 
 
 
4.2 Comparing SBC and IBC 
 
In this section to compare SBC and IBC we distinguish three cases. First, we compare profits assuming 
that the client maximizes her α given the SBC rule and her p given the IBC rule. Secondly, we compare 
the sum of both parties’ profits given the client’s optimal α and p. Thirdly, we compare aggregated 
profits assuming that the α and p is derived from maximizing the profits of both parties. 
    (1) Comparing client’s profits in case 2 to case 3, i.e. given the client’s optimal α and p. Comparing 
profits under SBC and IBC we first focus on client’s profits given that the client can determine the α 
and p. The client’s profit under SBC with the client’s optimal α is 
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    The client’s profit under IBC with the client’s optimal price p is 
 
 
 
Comparing both profits leads to 
 
 
 
    Numerical analysis shows that this term is always below 1. Therefore, we conclude that the client’s 
profit is always higher under the IBC rule as compared to the SBC rule given that the client chooses her 
optimal α and p, respectively. 
    (2) Comparing both parties’ aggregated profits in case 2 to case 3, i.e. given the client’s optimal α 
and p. Figure 2 shows the reaction functions under the three compensation rules and is based on the 
same principles as Fig. 1 above. 
    Figure 2 shows the reaction functions of the service provider R(S,SBC) and of the client R(C,SBC). We 
first note that the reaction function of the customer R(C,SBC) differs from the client’s reaction function 
under any other compensation rule (remember that the other reaction function for the customer is 
identical for two regimes R(C,IBC), R(C,PBC) and intersects the point JPM). R(S,SBC) represents the 
service supplier’s reaction function under SBC. The equilibrium under SBC is represented by EQ(SBC). 
    To compare the equilibrium profits under SBC and IBC we start by comparing the inputs. For the 
example we can easily see that the service supplier’s as well as the customer’s inputs are substantially 
lower as compared to IBC. 
    This result can be extended by comparing the general formulas for the inputs of service provider and 
the customer derived in Section 3: 
 
 
    Since α is between 0 and 1, the values α/σ and (1−α) are between 0 and 1. Consequently, the fraction 
of inputs under SBC divided by the inputs under IBC are smaller than 1 for the service provider and for 
the customer. It is clear now that the inputs under SBC are smaller than under IBC and therefore IBC 
implies higher aggregate profits as compared with SBC. We did not discuss the service provider’s profits 
because given the results it is easy for the client to pay a fixed amount to the service provider so that 
both profits are higher compared to the SBC case. Consequently, IBC is always superior to SBC. 
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    (3) Comparing both parties’ aggregated profits in case 5 to case 6, i.e. given the optimal α and p from 
aggregated profit maximizing. Up to now we based our comparisons on the assumption that the client 
determines the α and p for the three compensation rules. Now, we compare the aggregate profits 
under SBC and IBC assuming that the α for SBC and the p for IBC maximizes the sum of the profits of 
both parties. 
    Figure 3 shows the reaction functions based on these assumptions for SBC and IBC. It is clear that 
IBC is always superior to SBC because the equilibrium point for IBC now is the same as the JPM point. 
The equilibrium point for SBC on the other hand never reaches the JPM. 
 
 
 
    In general terms we have: 
    The sum of both parties’ profits under the two compensation rules is 
 
 
 
    To compare both profits we use the ratio 
 
 
   
  The term                 is smaller than 1 for each α between 0 and 1, therefore also for the optimal α. 
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    Raising the expression                                                                                    to the power of (1 −  
𝑢
𝜎
−  
𝑣
𝑡
)  
 
which is greater than 0 we get                                                             This is a weighted geometric mean of  
 
the three positive numbers  
 
 
 
 
We now show that this geometric mean is smaller than 1. Using the weighted arithmetic mean of the 
same numbers with the same weights, we get: 
 
 
 
     
    From the arithmetic-geometric mean inequality it follows that  
 
    Since the sum of profits in the IBC case is higher compared to the SBC case we can assure with a 
fixed amount of money paid from one party to the other that the profit of each individual party is 
higher in the IBC case. 
    We conclude that IBC is superior to SBC and PBC under all meaningful assumptions. 
 
 
5 Discussion and further research 
 
To our knowledge compensation rules for services have not been analyzed in a theoretical setting. We 
examined a special kind of services, namely integrated services where service provider’s and client’s 
input is necessary to get an output. This is a very common kind of service which can be found in 
consulting, advertising and training. The management literature claims that the compensation of these 
kind of services as well as others should be based on service value created for the client. The client’s 
value can be measured by additional sales or additional profits. So we analyzed a sales-based 
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compensation as well as a profit-based compensation and compared it to the commonly used input 
compensation. For the analysis we developed a model with a very general production and cost function 
and assumed no uncertainty and perfect information. 
    As the literature recommends we expected the value-based compensation to be superior to the 
input-based compensation. Surprisingly, we found that the inputbased compensation is superior to 
both forms of value-based compensation. 
    In the service management literature authors have argued based on plausibility that valued based 
pricing, i.e. sales or profit based compensation schemes are superior to input based compensation 
schemes (Lovelock et al. 1999). However, we are not aware of any modeling approach that supports 
this conclusion. Based on our model we find exactly the opposite: Input-based compensation is 
superior to value-based compensation. We are able to extend that result even to the conclusion that 
input-based compensation is superior to profit-based compensation. Our result may be even stronger 
in the case of uncertainty which is left for further research. Uncertainty typically means that value 
cannot be observed, especially the link between a particular input and its effect on the generated 
value. Input can be observed. So, in an uncertain environment input-based compensation may be the 
only way to compensate. Our results underpin the practitioners’ behavior from a theoretical 
perspective. Our result is also compatible with case-wise empirical observations. In many cases in 
service industries such as consulting, advertising and training service providers are compensated based 
on the number of hours or number or work days they deliver within a particular project. Contrary to 
the suggestion of the management literature these industry habits make sense in the light of our 
model. 
    The economic reason behind our result is the client’s ability to govern the service provider’s input 
using the input-based compensation. Since the service provider’s input depends mainly on the price 
he exactly gives the input which is appropriate for the given price. Therefore both parties do not end 
up in a conflict. On the other hand using the value-based compensation none of both parties can 
govern the other party’s input and therefore both parties do not care about the input but focus on the 
share of profit they get. Hence, they end up in a conflict. From this perspective practitioners do quite 
well in using input based compensation. 
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